Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment (published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
This paper develops a new form of metaethical expressivism according to which the normative judgment that X should Φ consists in a decision that X Φ. When the judgment is first-personal—e.g., my judgment that I should Φ—the view is similar to Gibbard’s plan expressivism, though the state I call “decision” differs somewhat from a Gibbard-style plan. The deep difference between the views shows in the account of third-personal judgments. Gibbard construes the judgment that Mary should Φ as a de se plan on the thinker’s part to Φ if she turns out to be Mary (the Subtle View). I construe the judgment as a decision for Mary that Mary Φ (the Simple View). The main argument for Simple Plan Expressivism is that it solves problems for Gibbard’s approach, resonates with a new and interesting moral psychology, and better makes sense of certain independently plausible constraints on normative judgment. In the end I argue that this account of normative judgment has implications for first-order ethics, implying in particular that rational egoism as standardly formulated is incoherent.
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Blaming for Unreasonableness: Accountability without Ill Will (published in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy)
Many theorists of moral responsibility endorse the following quality of will condition: X is blameworthy for a wrong act A only if in doing A, X expressed ill will. I argue that the quality of will condition is in fact false to ordinary moral practice, because ordinary practice licenses blame for agents who act wrongly from epistemically unreasonable ignorance of the wrong-making features of their act, even when the act does not express ill will. In response, I provide a theory of culpable ignorance, and blameworthiness more generally, on which ill will is not necessary for blameworthiness. My theory, which I will call Rational Capacitarianism, entails that when an agent acts wrongly from factual ignorance, she is blameworthy if and only if her ignorance is caused by a failure to exercise a rational capacity—a capacity to recognize reasons for believing and desiring and to be generally responsive in one’s beliefs and desires to one’s assessment of reasons. Failures of rational capacities are relevant because only such failures can be attributed to the agent in a distinctive way. My theory shows that we do not need to choose between a quality of will view (which seems too lenient) or a standard Capacitarian view (which seems too harsh).
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Can Model-Free Learning Explain Deontological Moral Judgment? (published in Cognition)
Dual-systems frameworks propose that moral judgments are derived from both an immediate emotional response, and controlled/rational cognition. Recently Cushman (2013) proposed a new dual-system theory based on model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. Model-free learning attaches values to actions based on their history of reward and punishment, and explains some deontological, non-utilitarian judgments. Model-based learning involves the construction of a causal model of the world and allows for far-sighted planning; this form of learning fits well with utilitarian considerations that seek to maximize certain kinds of outcomes. I present three concerns regarding the use of model-free reinforcement learning to explain deontological moral judgment. First, many actions that humans find aversive from model-free learning are not judged to be morally wrong. Moral judgment must require something in addition to model-free learning. Second, there is a dearth of evidence for central predictions of the reinforcement account—e.g., that people with different reinforcement histories will, all else equal, make different moral judgments. Finally, to account for the effect of intention within the framework requires certain assumptions which lack support. These challenges are reasonable foci for future empirical/theoretical work on the model-free/model-based framework.
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Rational Learners and Moral Rules (co-authored with Shaun Nichols, Shikhar Kumar, Theresa Lopez and Hoi-Yee Chan. Published in Mind & Language)
People draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non‐utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this article, we draw on Bayesian learning theory to develop a rational learning account. We argue that the ‘size principle’, which is implicated in word learning, can also explain how children would use scant and equivocal evidence to interpret candidate rules as applying more narrowly than utilitarian rules.
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